RECENT CASES
ment.- The attitude of the New York courts favors this trend away from the ordinary search for "intention."The ruling on the taxes and carrying charges is hard to justify. Ordinarily, they
are properly paid out of income. But an exception is made in the case of unproductive
land,'r3 taxes and carrying charges being properly chargeable to principal.X4 The taxes
on urban vacant land rapidly appreciating in value, such as was involved in this case,
might well have surpassed the total income from the productive property. It is hard
to believe that a testatrix who went to the trouble of creating a trust for the life
tenant would intend that the remaindermen "grow rich at the expense of the life
tenant,"s but so the Illinois court construed her intention.
Workmen's Compensation-Right of Employee's Illegitimate Children to Compensation-[Wyoming and Pennsylvania].-Non-resident, alien, illegitimate children of a
workman, who was killed during and in the course of his employment, and for whose
support the workman had made regular and substantial remittances to the mother,
sought compensation under the Wyoming Workmen's Compensation Act,' according
to which a non-resident alien child of a workman may under certain circumstances
receive compensation. Upon appeal from an award to the plaintiffs, held, reversed.
In re Dragoni.2
Workmen's compensation was sought by the illegitimate child of the wife of a
workman, who was killed during and in the course of his employment. The child was
living in the family of his mother's husband, and his claim for compensation was
based on a provision of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act,3 according
to which compensation may be granted to a "step-child" of a workman. On appeal
from a judgment for the plaintiff, held, affirmed. Union Trust Company v.Union
Collieries Co.4
"terms of the trust" as the "manifestation of intention of the settlor" as indicated by written
or spoken words or conduct of the settlor in the light of all the circumstances, seems to lead
one back to the policy of seeking the intention of the settlor by examination of all sorts of evidence.
"For an interpretation of the Restatement as abandoning the intention test, see 35 Col. L.
Rev. 306, 308 (I935); 40 Yale L. J. 275, 278 (1930).
12 "The distinction between this case and cases where there is no imperative power of sale
or equitable conversion; where the testator directs the trustees to sell only in their discretion
and where it is, therefore, said that the only inference is that testator intended to benefit the
principal of his estate ....may not ultimately prevail," Pound, J., in Matter of Jackson, 258
N.Y. 281, 291, 179 N.E. 496, 500 (1932).
'3 But see Matter of Satterwhite, 262 N.Y. 339, 186 N.E. 857 (1933) which seems to agree
with the view of the instant case on taxes where there was no imperative direction to sell unproductive property in the will. The New York courts, however, would undoubtedly have
construed this will as they did in Furniss v. Cruikshank, 23o N.Y. 495, 13o N.E. 625 (1921).
14 Patterson v. Johnson, 113 Ill.
559 (I885); Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 257, 20 S.W. 778 (1892);
Bogert, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 804; 2 Perry, Trusts and Trustees § 554 (7 th ed. 1929).
.sIn re Montgomery, 99 Misc. 473, 474, 165 N.Y. Supp. Io6g, 1070 (1917).
' Wyo. Rev. Stat. 1931, c. 124, §§ io6-7, k., as amended by Laws of 1935, c. boo, § 2.
2 79 P. (2d) 465 (Wyo. 1938).
3
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Atl. 267 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1938).
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The Wyoming statute makes no mention of what the term "children" shall indude other than to define the word as "immediate offspring,"s and this provision the
court held to have no effect other than that of excluding from the operation of the Act,
grandchildren and other more remote offspring of the workman. From a survey of the
definition of the word "children" in cases dealing with the interpretation of wills6
and statutes such as wrongful death acts,7 workmen's compensation acts of other
states,8 and of other statutes, the court concluded that the word "children," when
used in a statute without further explanation, did not include an illegitimate child of
a man.
In nearly every state the legislatures have improved the legal status of illegitimate
children in one respect or another,9 but only two states have gone so far as to declare
that illegitimate children shall have all the rights and privileges of legitimate offspring1o The courts are justified, therefore, in their reluctance to deviate from the
traditional interpretation of the words "child" and "children," when they appear
without qualification in statutes. To apply those terms to illegitimate children in
workmen's compensation laws or other statutes in a jurisdiction which has not assimilated the status of illegitimate children to that of legitimate children in every respect
would constitute a guess as to the intentions of the legislature. If, therefore, a legislature intends an illegitimate child to receive workmen's compensation upon the death
of his father, it has to say this expressly in the statute. Where, however, the position
of an illegitimate child has been assimilated to that of a legitimate child in his relation
to his mother, an award of workmen's compensation in the event of the death of his
mother appears justified under a statute which merely grants workmen's compensation
to the children of a woman without expressly mentioning illegitimate children.
The Pennsylvania decision reported supra is an application of this latter principle
since the court based its conclusion, that upon the marriage of the workman and the
child's mother the child had become the workman's step-child, upon a Pennsylvania
statute which provides that the relationship between the mother and her illegitimate
child shall be the same as if the child was born in lawful wedlock.- Although the Pennsylvania court cited no authority from other jurisdictions to substantiate its decision
in this case, the result it reached is exactly in line with decisions based upon corresponding facts in other jurisdictions.12
s Wyo. L. 1935, c. 100, S. 2.
6 Here the court cites Wilkinson v. Adam, i Ves. & Bea.
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(1813). But see Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Hodgkin, 48 R.I. 459, 137 Atl. 381 (1927),

and cases therein cited.
7 Citing Marshall v. Wabash Ry. Co.,
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Mo. 275, 25 S.W. 179 (1894).

8 Citing Bell v. Terry & Tench Co., 177 App. Div. 123, 163 N.Y. Supp. 733 (1917); Scott v.
Independent Ice Co., 135 Md. 343, iog At. 117 (i919); Murrellv. Industrial Comm'n, 291 Ill.
334, 126 N.E. 189 (1920); Staker v. Industrial Comm'n, 127 Ohio St. 13, i86 N.E. 66 (1933).
9 See 4 Vernier, American Family Laws § 242 ff. (1936), and references cited therein.
U

Arizona and North Dakota, op. cit. supra note 9, at §
Purdon's Pa. Stat. 1931, Title ii, § i.
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N.W. 673 (1931); Larsen v.

Harris Structural Steel Co., 230 App. Div. 280, 243 N.Y. Supp. 654 (1930); Simpson v. State
Compensation Com'r, 114 W.Va. 814, 174 S.E. 329 (1934).

